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Abstract
Using a panel of large U.S. banks, we examine banks' risk-taking behaviour in
response to monetary policy shocks. Our investigation provides support for the
presence of a risk-taking channel: banks' non-performing loans increase in the
medium to long-run following an expansionary monetary policy shock. We
also find that banks' capital structure plays an important role in explaining
bank's risk-taking appetite. Impulse response analysis shows that shocks ema-
nating from larger banks spill over to the rest of the sector but no such effect is
observed for smaller banks. These findings are confirmed for banks' Z-score.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Long before the global financial crisis, Rajan (2006) has
predicted a perfect storm that will hit the United States
and the rest of the world economies. He argued that a set-
ting with low returns followed by a period of high rates
could lead to a sharp and messy realignment because of
managers' search for yield as asset prices revalue.1 The
realignment of financial markets that followed the col-
lapse of the Lehman Brothers in 2008 proved him right.
Following the financial crisis in 2008, researchers
have begun to examine the link between monetary policy
and financial institutions' appetite for risk.2 Based on the
underpinnings of the theoretical research on the risk-tak-
ing channel (e.g., see Borio & Zhu, 2012), several
researchers provided evidence that in an environment
with low interest rates, banks exhibit risk-taking behav-
iour. For example, Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina
(2014), using a unique bank-level dataset for Spain,
showed that bank loans to borrowers with bad credit his-
tory and a higher probability of default increase following
a reduction in the overnight rates. Examining bank-level
data from Bolivia, the United States and the EU, similar
observations were reported by Ioannidou, Ongena, and
Peydró (2015), Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marqués-
Ibáñez (2014) and Angeloni, Faia, & Lo Duca, 2015. In
contrast, De Graeve, Kick, and Koetter (2008), using a
model that examines the interaction between bank-level
distress and macroeconomic risk, found that the proba-
bility of distress declines after a positive monetary policy
shock. Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto (2014a) have pro-
vided strong evidence that the response of a forward-
looking bank risk to an expansionary monetary policy
shock varies across different types of banks. In particular,
they found that small domestic banks increase their expo-
sure to risk while large domestic banks do not change
their risk exposure and foreign owned banks take on
more risk.
In this context, Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez
(2017) argue that when banks are allowed to adjust their
capital structures, lower interest rates lead to greater
leverage and higher risk. However, if the capital structure
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is fixed, the impact of a reduction in interest rates on
bank risk depends on the degree of bank capitalization:
well-capitalized banks increase risk, while highly levered
banks may decrease it, if loan demand is linear or con-
cave. Also it is useful to recall the financial accelerator
model developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1996) which implies that lower interest rates may have
countervailing effects on bank risk. In particular, while
low interest rates would reduce bank risk by decreasing
the interest burden of firms, it would also increase the
collateral value and borrowing capability of high-risk
firms.3
In this study, we contribute to the empirical literature
of risk-taking channel by implementing a flexible econo-
metric framework, which accounts both for the heteroge-
neity of banks' risk-taking behaviour in response to
monetary policy shocks and for the transmission of
shocks across banks (spillover effects) with differing char-
acteristics. We use the Global Vector Autoregression
(GVAR) methodology (see Pesaran, Schuermann, & Wei-
ner, 2004) to estimate the potential interactions among a
large set of variables by decomposing the underlying
large VARs into smaller conditional models that are
linked together through their cross-sectional averages
while no restrictions are imposed on the dynamics of the
individual sub-models.4 In this setting, we can address
issues that have not been examined earlier such as the
spillover effects or the heterogeneity of banks' responses
to monetary policy shocks.5
An additional contribution we make to this literature
relates to the identification of monetary policy shocks, as
this problem constitutes a major challenge when examin-
ing the linkages between the monetary transmission
mechanism and the risk-taking channel. It is well known
that the use of a monetary shock which is not properly
identified would yield biased results in relation to its true
causal effects on banks' risk-taking behaviour. The main
difficulty in gauging the link between low interest rates
and banks' risk-taking behaviour is to isolate changes in
monetary policy from the impact of expected default.
Although, one can argue that monetary policy is exoge-
nous to the future default rate, because financial stability
is not included directly in the bank's loss function, the
fact that defaults are related to future economic condi-
tions suggests for the presence of an indirect association
between the current monetary policy and the expected
default rates.6,7 Therefore, in investigating the effects of
monetary policy on banks' risk-taking attitude, one
should account for the presence of endogeneity between
the proxy for monetary policy and credit risk, as these
variables would respond simultaneously to expected mac-
roeconomic conditions.8
To overcome the problem of endogeneity, we follow
the Romer and Romer (2004) (hereafter RR) approach by
regressing the intended fund rate changes on the contem-
poraneous rate of unemployment and on the Fed's inter-
nal forecast of inflation and of real economic activity. In
our investigation, we modify the RR approach such that
the parameters of the model are allowed to be time-vari-
ant with regime switching.9 We follow this route because
the RR approach imposes the restriction that the role of
forward-looking variables in the central bank's reaction
function remains constant across time. Our modification
is consistent with the findings of Barakchian and Crowe
(2013) who argued that not only the Fed has become
more forward-looking after 1988 but also a monetary pol-
icy shock based on RR approach was subject to structural
breaks and time variation.
We examine the presence of a risk-taking channel by
scrutinizing the response of banks' non-performing loans
to total loans ratio as monetary policy changes. We find
that in the short-run, banks' non-performing loans mod-
erately decline in response to an expansionary monetary
policy shock. However, in the medium-run, non-per-
forming loans tend to increase for most of the banks in
our sample, suggesting the prevalence of a risk-taking
channel. Furthermore, our investigation shows that
although in the short-run the reaction of banks to an
expansionary policy shock is rather homogeneous, in the
medium- and the long-run, the magnitude and the dura-
tion of banks' reactions vary. We provide evidence that
banks' heterogeneous risk-taking responses relate to their
capital structure. Finally, when we examine the impulse
response functions, we provide evidence that bank size
plays an important role in the transmission of shocks
(spillover effects): an adverse shock to the non-per-
forming loans of a large bank would lead to an immedi-
ate and long lasting impact on the remaining banks
within the system, while no such effect is observed when
the adverse shock emanates from a smaller bank. We
confirm our findings using banks' Z-score as an alterna-
tive measure for bank risk. We examine the presence of a
risk-taking channel of monetary policy under normal
economic conditions: the investigation uses quarterly
data over the period from 1985Q1 to 2007Q4.
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section
2 provides a brief review of the literature on the risk-tak-
ing channel. Section 3 explains our methodology. Section
4 provides information on the data as well as the con-
struction of the monetary policy shock and bank risk
measures. Section 5 presents our empirical observations.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 | A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
Borio and Zhu (2012) suggest that there are at least three
ways through which the risk-taking channel may operate
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when interest rates are kept low or declining for a long
period. First, they argue that a reduction in the interest
rate leads to an increase in collateral and asset values of
borrowers, which in turn influences banks' risk percep-
tions or risk tolerance and increase banks' lending. In
this context, lending is driven by banks' willingness to
take on more risk rather than improvements in debtors'
collateral and repayment capacity.10 The second channel
(referred to as “search for yield” by Rajan, 2006) relates
to the linkages between a bank manager's target return
and the market rate of return. This channel operates
through financial institutions' desire to engage in risky
investment activities, as they are obliged to reduce the
gap between the yield on highly rated government bonds
and the minimum guaranteed rate of return linked to
their liabilities.11 Thirdly, transparency may enhance the
perception that the central bank's actions would cut off
large downside risks encouraging risk-taking.
All three channels indicate that monetary policy eas-
ing will induce greater risk-taking. However, these chan-
nels will not operate in a similar way across different
banks, different banking systems and time. An analytical
model provided by Dell'Ariccia et al. (2017) predicts that
the strength of the relationship between the policy rate
and bank risk-taking is a function of bank's capital struc-
ture, borrowers' collateral and monitoring cost. In partic-
ular, they show that the policy rate has a negative
association with banks' risk-taking behaviour which
relates to the capitalization of banks.
Using bank-level data, empirical researchers have
examined the risk-taking channel by scrutinizing
whether banks extend loans to riskier borrowers during
low interest rate periods. To that end, Jiménez et al.
(2014), using loan-level data from the Spanish Credit
Register, have shown that lower overnight interest rates
induce less capitalized banks to grant more loans to ex-
ante risky firms. They showed that these banks also com-
mit to larger loan volumes with fewer collateral require-
ments to firms which have a higher ex post likelihood of
default. Ioannidou et al. (2015) have examined the impact
of the federal funds rate on the riskiness and pricing of
new bank loans granted in Bolivia. They reported evi-
dence that initiating loans with a sub-prime credit rating
or loans to riskier borrowers with current or past non-
performance become more likely when the federal funds
rate is low.12 Maddaloni and Peydró (2011), using data
from the United States and Europe, have shown that
banks' risk tolerance increases when the short-term inter-
est rate is low but not when the long-term interest rate
changes. Similar results are reported by Altunbas et al.
(2014) and Angeloni et al. (2015) who examined a sample
of banks in Europe and the United States.
Other researchers have shown that the impact of
monetary expansion on bank risk might be different
across the banking system, time and banking groups. For
instance, Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto (2014b), using a
FAVAR model, which included both macro and bank-
level data from the Call Reports, have shown that a back-
ward-looking bank risk decline after a monetary policy
loosening, which is contradictory to the results found in
the papers discussed above. Buch et al. (2014a), using
data from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending in the
United States, have shown that there is no evidence of
increased risk-taking for the entire banking system after
an expansionary monetary policy shocks or an unex-
pected increase of housing prices. However, they argued
that there are important differences across banking
groups. In particular, they showed that bank risk
increases for small domestic banks while it declines for
foreign banks and remains unchanged for large domestic
banks. Furthermore, De Graeve et al. (2008) have pro-
vided evidence of a decline in German banks' probability
of distress after a monetary policy loosening.
We adopt an approach that differs from the literature
by employing a GVAR model to investigate banks' risk-
taking behaviour. We also discuss whether there is any
type of systematic heterogeneity in the way banks react
to exogenous shocks and examine the possibility of spill-
over effects across banks. Finally, we confirm our find-
ings using banks' Z-score as an alternative measure of
risk. In what follows, we discuss our empirical methodol-
ogy and our findings.
3 | ECONOMETRIC
METHODOLOGY
An investigation regarding the impact of monetary policy
and macroeconomic shocks on bank risk while account-
ing for possible spillover and feedback effects requires a
coherent global model that includes a large set of vari-
ables from many institutions. There are a few methodolo-
gies that one may implement for such an investigation. A
standard framework to examine the transmission of
shocks across banks and time is VAR models. However,
unrestricted VAR models cannot be estimated due to the
large number of unknown parameters.
To get around the curse of dimensionality,
researchers have proposed alternative approaches. For
example, factor models can be interpreted as data shrink-
age procedures, which summarize the information of a
large set of variables in a few factors augmented by a
small set of observed variables (i.e., FAVAR models). Yet,
the economic interpretation of the extracted factors is a
difficult task. Alternatively, panel VARs or large scale
Bayesian VARs solve the problem of dimensionality by
shrinking the parameter space.13 In particular, Canova
and Ciccarelli (2013) show that a panel VAR shrinks the
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parameter space by assuming that the unknown parame-
ters can be decomposed into components that are com-
mon across cross-sectional units and variables, common
within cross-section units, a variable specific component
and lag specific component.
Unlike the panel VAR, the GVAR approach solves
the dimensionality problem by breaking down the under-
lying large VAR model into a small number of condi-
tional models which are linked together via their cross-
sectional averages. That is, the GVAR methodology
imposes an intuitive restriction on cross-sectional link-
ages without imposing any restriction on the dynamics of
individual units, allowing the researcher to investigate
the transmission of real and financial shocks across coun-
tries, regions and financial intermediaries. In this con-
text, the GVAR approach lets us capture the risk of
contagion within the financial system, which has become
more pronounced due to increasing financial integration
and complex linkages throughout the financial
intermediaries.
3.1 | The GVAR model
We consider a world of N banks indexed by i = 1, 2,…N,
and denote a ki × 1 vector of bank-specific variables, xit,
and of bank-specific foreign variables xit = Σ
N
j=1wijxjt
where wij ≥ 0 is a sequence of bank-specific weights with
Σ
N
j= iwij =1 and wii =0. We construct the associated
weights based on banks' bilateral interbank exposure,
which we constructed using banks' aggregate interbank
assets and liabilities. In doing so we assume that each
bank borrows and lends as widely as possible across all
banks. This assumption implies that the exposure of bank
i to bank j is increasing both with the total interbank
lending of bank i and total interbank borrowing of bank
j. In that sense, bank exposure reflects the relative impor-
tance of an institution in the interbank market. In con-
structing the weights, we also assume that the largest
bank acts as a money centre for the other banks in the
system.14
The bank-specific VARX*(pi, qi) can be written as
15:
Φi L,pið Þxit = ai0 + ai1t+Ψi L,qið Þdt +Λi L,qið Þx

it +uit,
ð1Þ
where L is the lag operator, Φi L,pið Þ= Iki−
Ppi
l=1
ΦlL
l , Λi(L,
qi) =
Pqi
l=0
ΛlL
l and Ψi(L, qi) =
Pqi
l=0
ΨlL
l are matrix polyno-
mials, dt is a g× 1 vector of observed common variables
such as regulatory and shifts dummies. The vector of
bank-specific idiosyncratic shocks is denoted by uit,
where E uitu
0
js
 
=Σij for t = s and E uitu
0
js
 
=0 for t 6¼ s.
The dimensions of aiη (η = 0, 1) are ki× 1 while the
dimension of Φl, Λi, Ψi are ki× ki, ki × k

i and ki× g,
respectively. Equation (1) indicates that spillover effects
across banks can occur through three distinct but interre-
lated channels: a) direct and lagged impact of xit on xit; b)
dependence of bank-specific variables on common global
exogenous variables (i.e., dt); and c) non-zero contempo-
raneous dependence of shocks via cross-bank covari-
ances Σij.
Reordering Equation (1), we obtain:
Ai L,pi,qið Þzit = ai0 + ai1t+Ψi L,qið Þdt +uit, ð2Þ
where
zit = xit,x

it
 0
Ai L,pi,qið Þ= Φi L,pið Þ−Λi L,qið Þ½ :
Let p = max(pi, qi) and construct Ai L,pð Þ=
Pp
l=0
AilL
l
then Equation (2) can be written as
Ai0zit = ai0 + ai1t+
Xp
l=1
Ailzit− l +
Xp
l=0
Ψildt− l +uit, ð3Þ
where Ai0= Iki , −Λi0ð Þ, Ail = (Φil, Λil) for l = 1, 2,…p, Φil
= 0 for l> pi and Λil = 0 for l> qi. Estimation of Equation
(3) is the first step of the GVAR approach. The second
step consists of stacking N bank-specific models in one
large global VAR. Letting xt = x
0
1t,x
0
2t,…x
0
Nt
 0
and using
the (ki + k

i Þ× k link matrices Wi= ½E
0
i,
~Wi
0
, where E is a
k× ki dimensional selection matrix so that xit =E
0
i xt and
~Wi is k × k

i so that x

it =
~W
0
ixt, we have
16:
zit =
xit
xit
 
=Wixt: ð4Þ
Substituting Equation (4) into Equation (3) yields
Ai0Wixt = ai0 + ai1t+
Xp
l=1
AilWixt− l+
Xp
l=0
Ψildt− l+uit,
ð5Þ
and stacking these models for i = 1, 2,…N, we obtain
G0xt = a0+ a1t+
Xp
l=1
Glxt− l +
Xp
l=0
Ψldt− l+ut, ð6Þ
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where ut = u
0
1t,u
0
2t,…,u
0
Nt
 	0
, and
a0=
a10
a20



aN0
0
BBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCA
, a1=
a11
a21



aN1
0
BBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCA
, Gl =
A1lW1
A2lW2



ANlWN
0
BBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCA
,Ψl =
Ψ1l
Ψ2l



ΨNl
0
BBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCA
for l = 1, 2,…p. If the matrix G0 is invertible, then we can
write Equation (6) as:
xt =
Xp
l=0
Flxt− l +G
−1
0 ut, ð7Þ
where Fl =G
−1
0 Gl . The GVAR model (7) can be solved
recursively and used for the impulse response function
analysis.
4 | DATA
The analysis is carried out using both macroeconomic
and bank-level data on a quarterly basis covering the
period 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. We do not use the post-2007
data to avoid agency problems between the borrowers
and lenders, which are expected to be larger in crisis
periods in comparison to the normal times. Furthermore,
as the framework of monetary policy has changed sub-
stantially following the global financial crisis, it is prefer-
able to examine the presence of risk-taking channel of
monetary policy in normal conditions to capture the true
relation.
Our GVAR framework utilizes bank-level variables
extracted from the Call Reports, available on the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago website.17 Using this dataset,
we construct bank's total loans to total assets ratio, (tlit,
rcfd1400/rcfd2170).18 We use return on assets, (qit,
riad4340/rcfd2170), as a performance measure. The share
of non-performing loans to total loans is our main proxy
for bank risk (brit). Non-performing loans are defined as
assets past due 90 days or more (rcfd1403), plus assets
placed in non-accrual status (rcfd1407).
We also used macroeconomic variables including the
GDP (yt) and real house prices (hp
r
t ). Real house prices
were measured as a ratio of the Freddie Mac Mortgage
price to the GDP deflator. Data on house prices were
extracted from FreeLunch.com. Data on the GDP deflator
were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.
4.1 | Constructing bank-level data
To carry out the investigation, we extracted bank-level
data from the largest 100 banks in the United States given
their 2007 total asset values. The analysis focused on
those banks which fully contribute to the dataset for the
entire period under scrutiny. We screened banks from
our database if their loan to assets ratio was greater than
one.19 Furthermore, we eliminated those banks whose
non-performing loans to total loans ratio or return to
asset ratio were in the bottom or the top percentile at any
point in time.20
Our final bank-level sample is comprised of 30 banks
which commanded 46% of the total assets in the U.S.
banking system in 2007.21 Figure 1 shows the ranking of
the banks in the sample based on banks' total assets,
where the largest bank is Bank2 and the smallest bank is
Bank61. Table 1 provides some details on our bank-level
data. Figure 2 presents the average total loans of these
banks. Given the size of total loans depicted in this fig-
ure, we deduce that some banks have a larger proportion
of their assets in non-traditional bank activities. As
portrayed in Figure 3, which shows the composition of
the loan portfolios of all banks, our sample is very hetero-
geneous. In fact, the theoretical literature on risk-taking
channel argues that individual bank characteristics play
a significant role on the response of risk variables to
monetary and other shocks.
4.2 | Measuring bank risk
The risk-taking channel focuses on the incentives of
banks to engage in ex-ante risky investments. Given the
nature of our data, we cannot distinguish new loans from
outstanding loans at the time of a monetary policy shock.
Hence, similar to Buch et al. (2014b), we use the share of
non-performing loans to total loans as our main proxy for
bank's risk (brit). This proxy informs us about changes in
the overall quality of the stock of credit and allows us to
scrutinize the relationship between monetary policy and
the stability of the financial intermediaries. Furthermore,
this ratio is not significantly affected by the changes in
the accounting standards and it can be constructed over a
long time period.
We use the Z-score, as an alternative proxy for bank
risk.22 This measure can be interpreted as the distance
(number of SDs) that a bank's profit has to fall for the
bank to become insolvent. Hence, it is inversely related
to the probability of insolvency: the higher the Z-score is,
the more stable the bank is. This widely used risk mea-
sure is calculated as:
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Z=
ROAit +CARit
Sd ROAitð Þ
,
where ROA is the return on assets (riad4340/rsfd2170),
CAR is total equity over total assets of bank i in year t
(rcfd3210/rcfd2170) and Sd(ROA) is the standard devia-
tion (SD) of return on assets. Figures 4 and 5 show the
ranking of banks in our sample according to their non-
performing ratio and the Z-score, respectively. Even
though the focus of each measure is different, these fig-
ures show that both measures yield a very similar rank-
ing of banks.
4.3 | Measuring monetary policy shock
One of the challenges in examining the link between
monetary policy shocks and banks' risk-taking behaviour
is the identification of exogenous changes in monetary
policy. The use of poor proxies for monetary policy
shocks would lead to biased results due to reverse causal-
ity (that future risk may imply current monetary expan-
sions) or omitted variables as such variables, which are
correlated with the stance of monetary policy, can influ-
ence risk-taking activities of banks. Although expected
defaults are not explicitly included in the reaction func-
tion of central banks, they might be considered indirectly
because expected economic conditions would have a
direct impact on future defaults. For example, Bernanke
and Gertler (1999) argue that policy rates should not
respond to changes in asset prices unless they signal
changes in expected inflation. Furthermore, Ioannidou
et al. (2015) show that during periods of financial
uncertainty central banks tend to reduce interest rates.
Therefore, one should consider the endogeneity between
monetary policy decision and financial uncertainty (dur-
ing which the number of expected defaults increase) in
an empirical investigation.
A standard approach employed in the literature to
identify a monetary policy shock has been the VAR
methodology. However, this methodology can be criti-
cized in two aspects. First, because policy makers have
become more forward-looking over the years, identifica-
tion of monetary policy shocks using VAR models has
become a more difficult task.23 Furthermore, the identifi-
cation problem gets worse if there is evidence of non-fun-
damentalness.24 Second, Benati and Surico (2009) argue
that there is a fundamental disconnect between what is a
structural shock within a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model and what is identified as
structural in the corresponding VAR representation
implied by the same DSGE model. In fact, recent
research has shown that comparison of structural VAR
(SVAR) estimates with those from a DSGE model is not
straightforward and that caution must be exercised.25
The identification of monetary policy shocks becomes
an even more complicated task once we consider the
view that central banks have to account for future
defaults. To overcome this hurdle, one can use the RR
approach, which suggests regressing the intended policy
rates on the Fed's forecast of inflation and real economic
activity.26 However, the RR approach assumes that the
impact of forward-looking variables on the central bank's
reaction function remains constant across time. Yet,
Barakchian and Crowe (2013), using estimates from a
0
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FIGURE 1 Banks' ranking
according to assets size. Notes: The
figure shows ranking of the 30 banks
used in the analysis with respect to
banks' 2007 asset size. The figure is
constructed using “rcfd2170” call
report item [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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five-year rolling window, have shown that the RMSE and
R2 figures obtained from the RR model vary significantly
over the sample. Moreover, Barakchian and Crowe
(2013) have demonstrated that the forward-looking vari-
ables in the RR model becomes significant only after
1988. These results suggest that a proxy which fails to
capture time variation and structural breaks in the data
generation process will lead to biased estimates. Hence,
rather than directly implementing the RR model, we
extend it to account for time variation and endogenous
regime shifts by allowing the parameters of the condi-
tional mean to be time-varying while the variance of the
error term to follow a Markov regime switching pro-
cess.27 The resulting monetary policy series are plotted in
Figure 6.
Note that by allowing for parameters to be time-vary-
ing we account for the impact of structural breaks driven
by external uncertainty. In particular, by allowing for
Markov switching in the error term not only we account
for the potential heteroscedasticty in the errors but we
TABLE 1 Summary information
Name of the bank
Bank's
ID Rank
Consolidated
assets
Domestic
assets (%)
Domestic
branches Foreign
JPMORGAN CHASE BK NA 852218 2 1,179,390 652,824 (55) 2,852 46
CITIBANK NA 476810 3 1,019,497 53,786 (53) 1,005 375
WACHOVIA BK NA 484422 4 518,123 487,894 (94) 3,159 11
WELLS FARGO BK NA 451965 5 398,671 398,546 (100) 4,052 2
US BK NA 504713 6 217,802 216,581 (99) 2,822 1
SUNTRUST BK 675332 7 182,628 182,628 (100) 1942 0
NATIONAL CITY BK 259518 11 134,345 133,894 (100) 1,468 2
STATE STREET B & TC 35301 13 96,296 82,651 (86) 2 10
PNC BK NA 817824 15 90,142 88,357 (98) 953 0
KEYBANK NA 280110 16 88,081 85,863 (97) 1,158 1
BANK OF NY 541101 17 85,952 52,731 (61) 8 9
CITIBANK SD NA 486752 19 79,761 79,761 (100) 0 0
COMERICA BK 60143 21 58,543 57,252 (98) 382 1
FIFTH THIRD BK 723112 25 52,672 52,672 (100) 415 1
NORTHERN TC 210434 26 52,313 33,358 (64) 17 3
FIFTH THIRD BK 913940 29 48,441 48,441 (100) 718 0
M & I MARSHALL 983448 30 48,017 48,017 (100) 309 0
COMMERCE BK NA 363415 33 41,170 41,170 (100) 343 0
FIRST HORIZON NAT
CORP
485559 36 37,608 37,608 (100) 222 0
HUNTINGTON NB 12311 38 34,914 34,914 (100) 491 0
COMPASS BK 697633 39 34,181 34,181 (100) 444 0
MELLON BK NA 934329 42 26,226 22,713 (87) 26 1
ASSOCIATED BK NA 917742 46 20,532 20,532 (100) 351 0
ZIONS FIRST NB 276579 51 14,849 14,848 (100) 169 0
CITY NB 63069 53 14,665 14,665 (100) 72 0
BANK OF OK NA 339858 54 14,366 13,766 (96) 79 0
COMMERCE BK NA 601050 56 13,891 13,891 (100) 169 0
FIRST-CITIZENS B & TC 491224 58 13,327 13,327 (100) 334 0
FROST NB/CULLEN 682563 59 13,307 13,307 (100) 123 0
VALLEY NB/VALLEY NBC 229801 61 12,364 12,364 (100) 161 0
Notes: The table shows information about the 30 banks used in this paper as of 2007. The ranking is based on total assets. Assets are in thou-
sands of U.S.$. Data are from The Federal Reserve System, see https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/.
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also account for the unobserved forward-looking ele-
ments represented by an unobserved state variable. To
that end, Jeanne and Masson (2000) argue that the
unobserved state of Markov switching model reflects
market expectations. In the same spirit, Davig and Leeper
(2007) treat regime shifts as an ongoing process in the
sense that if a regime has changed, then a regime can
change again. This is because, agents form expectations
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FIGURE 2 Banks' average
total loans. Notes: The figure
shows the average total loans of
the 30 banks over the sample
period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The
figure is constructed using
“rcfd1400” call report item
[Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Real Estate Commercial Individuals
FIGURE 3 Banks' total loan composition. Notes: The figure shows the composition of the loan portfolios of the 30 banks used in the
paper. The figure represents the average of each component over the sample period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The figure is constructed using:
“rcfd1975” to capture loans to individuals, “rcfd1600” to capture commercial and industrial loans and “rcfd1410” to capture loans secured by
real estate
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to reflect the belief that a regime change is possible.
Hence, expectations about regime changes will affect the
agents' behaviour in the current regime.28 In our case, by
allowing for time variation and regime shifts in the stan-
dard RR model, we implicitly account for alternative
sources of uncertainty that might affect the Fed's reaction
function.29
5 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we present and discuss our empirical
results.30 As a prerequisite, we start our investigation by
testing the order of integration of the endogenous and
exogenous variables. We then examine the endogeneity
of bank-specific foreign variables.31 Next, we discuss
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FIGURE 4 Banks'
average non-performing loans
ratio. Notes: The figure shows
the ranking of the average
non-performing loans ratio of
the 30 banks used in the paper
over the sample period,
1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The figure
is constructed using:
“rcfd1400” to capture total
loans and “rcfd1407
+ rcfd1403” to capture total
non-performing loans [Colour
figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 5 Banks'
Average Z-score. Notes: The
figure shows the average Z-
score of the 30 banks used in
the paper over the sample
period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The
figure is constructed using:
“riad4340” to capture net
income, “rsfd2170” to capture
total assets and “rcfd3210” to
capture total equity capital
[Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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impulse response functions of non-performing loans to
monetary policy shocks. Subsequently, we examine the
spillover effects that may emerge due to global shocks or
due to shocks emanating from large versus small banks.
Lastly, we use banks' Z-score as an alternative measure of
bank risk and confirm our findings.
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FIGURE 6 Monetary policy
shock measure. Notes: The figure
plots the Romer and Romer (2004)
based monetary policy measure
accounting for time variation and
endogenous regime shifts by
allowing the parameters of the
conditional mean to be time-
varying while the variance of the
error term to follow a Markov
regime switching process. The
sample period is, 1985Q1 to
2007Q4 [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 7 Response of non-performing loans to a negative shock in interest rate [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 8 Average
equity to capital ratio. The
figure shows the average
equity to capital ratio of the 30
banks used in the paper over
the sample period, 1985Q1 to
2007Q4. The figure is
constructed using: “rcfd1400”
to capture total loans and
“rcfd1407+rcfd1403” to
capture total non-performing
loans [Colour figure can be
viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 9 Response of return on assets to a negative shock in interest rate [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Our GVAR model includes the following vectors of
endogenous and star (exogenous) variables:
xit = brit,qit, tlit,yt,hp
r
t
 
,
xit= br

it,q

it, tl

it, rrt
 
,
where, brit, qit, tlit, yt, hp
r
t denote bank risk, return on
assets, total loans to assets, output growth and real house
prices, respectively. The corresponding exogenous foreign
specific variables and the monetary policy shock are
given by brit , q

it , tl

it and rrt, respectively. Note that by
construction, monetary policy shocks (rrt) are assumed to
be exogenous. Furthermore, based on the estimation of
VARX*(pi, qi), the null hypothesis of exogeneity for all
variables in xit are confirmed.
6 | IMPULSE RESPONSE
FUNCTION ANALYSIS
In what follows, we simulate the following innovations:
(a) the impact of an expansionary monetary policy shock
on banks' non-performing loans and return on assets; (b)
the impact of a negative global shock on banks' non-per-
forming loans; (c) the impact of a negative shock that
emanates from a large and a small bank on the rest of the
banks' in the system. Results from banks' Z-score, as an
alternative proxy for risk-taking behaviour, confirm our
findings.
6.1 | Impulse response to an
expansionary monetary policy shock and
bank heterogeneity
Here, we focus on the effect of a negative interest rate
shock (expansionary monetary policy) to scrutinize
banks' risk-taking behaviour. In doing so we examine the
effect of a downward movement in policy rate rather
than an upward movement, because bank risk is more
sensitive to expansionary monetary policy shocks (see
Lopez, Tenjo, & Zarate, 2011). In what follows, we inves-
tigate the behaviour of banks' non-performing loans and
confirm our observations by examining movements in
banks' Z-score in response to an expansionary monetary
policy shock.
FIGURE 10 Response of non-performing loans to a negative shock in Bank3 non-performing loans [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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6.1.1 | Response of non-performing
loans
Figure 7 shows that, in the short-run, non-performing
loans of all banks generally decline in response to a
downward one SD shock to monetary policy. However,
this initial response reverses in the medium-run as non-
performing loans begin to increase for most banks. In
particular, banks' non-performing loans, that is, bank
risk, increase after the fourth quarter following the
expansionary monetary policy shock. This reversal is con-
sidered as evidence in favour of the risk-taking channel
(see, for example, Altunbas et al., 2011).
The dynamics of non-performing loans can be
explained as follows. Following an expansionary mone-
tary policy shock, banks extend credit to credit worthy as
well as risky borrowers, as the collateral and asset values
of potential borrowers increase. In the short-run, all new
borrowers are expected to pay the interest charge on the
loans given the low rates. As a result, a drop in non-per-
forming loans is expected when the interest rate declines
due to the reduction of the interest burden on existing
borrowers. However, in the long-run, as interest rates
increase, coupled with the competitive nature of the
business environment, a fair number of riskier borrowers
could fail to comply with their commitments and render
an increase in non-performing loans. In fact this is what
we observe in Figure 7.
The reaction of non-performing loans to the monetary
policy shock varies across banks. Dell'Ariccia et al. (2017)
argue that in the medium- to long-run, the response of
bank risk to a monetary policy shock is driven by two
countervailing forces, which are related to the bank's cap-
ital structure. In particular, due to limited liability there
is the risk-shifting effect, which increases the probability
of monitoring after a decrease of the policy rate. Alterna-
tively, there is the pass-through effect, which decreases
the incentive to monitor due to declining profits follow-
ing a decrease in the lending rate. The relative strength
of these two forces depends on the extent of bank capital-
ization. For a low level of capitalization, the former will
dominate the latter effect and lead to a lower level of
non-performing loans. This is because low policy rates
will increase the intermediation margin. Thus, banks
with high levels of leverage have an incentive to increase
monitoring to realize expected returns from higher mar-
gin. However, for banks with high levels of capital, the
pass-through effect will dominate leading to an increase
FIGURE 11 Response of non-performing loans to a negative shock in Bank61 non-performing loans [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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of non-performing loans. In the light of this discussion,
banks with higher deposits in their capital structure are
expected to yield low risk (for instance Bank2, Bank13,
Bank26, Bank33 and Bank61), whereas, banks with high
equity to capital ratio (for instance Bank5 and Bank7)
would exhibit stronger movements in their non-per-
forming loans. Figure 8 plots banks' average equity capi-
tal ratios.
6.1.2 | Response of return on assets
A related problem is the evolution of return on assets as
monetary policy changes. Figure 9 depicts the response of
banks' return on assets to an expansionary monetary pol-
icy shock. We find that banks' return on assets would
increase in the short-run but fall in the medium horizon.
This is consistent with the results observed in Figure 7
where non-performing loans decrease in the short-run
but increase in the medium-run. As a consequence,
return on assets increases initially, as non-performing
loans decline. However, in the medium-run, as non-per-
forming loans increase, return on assets declines.
Recall that, through a negative change of the policy
rate, the policymakers' aim is to achieve higher economic
growth and lower unemployment by inducing businesses
to increase their fixed investment expenditures. However,
our examination shows that expansionary monetary pol-
icy shocks can introduce certain fragility into the finan-
cial system evidenced by declining return on assets and
increasing non-performing loans in the medium- to the
long-run. This observation is in contrast with the initial
objectives of the policy makers and suggestive for the
prevalence of the risk-taking channel.
6.2 | Spillover effects: Global versus
bank-specific shocks
An important question is whether there is evidence of spill-
over effects of credit risk within the banking system. To
examine the spillover effects we took two routes. Initially,
following Dees, Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), we gen-
erated a global bank risk shock, which is defined as the
weighted average of specific shocks across all banks and
examined its impact on non-performing loans of individual
banks. Results, which are available upon request, do not
provide clear evidence of spillover effects due to global
shocks. For some banks, there is evidence that the risk is
increasing but for some others, we find no such effects.
FIGURE 12 Response of banks' Z-score to a negative shock in interest rate [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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In contrast, when we investigate the impact of an
adverse shock emanating from an individual bank to the
rest of the system, we find evidence that risk could spill-
over through the financial system. To that end, we pro-
vide details for the case of a shock that emanated from a
large bank, Bank3, and that from a small bank, Bank61.
It should be noted that in terms of assets, Bank3 is on
average 10 times larger than Bank61. Furthermore, based
on the Z-score and non-performing loans, it turns out
that Bank3 is one of the riskiest bank whereas Bank61
can be considered as one of the least risky bank in our
sample.
Figures 10 and 11 portray the response of banks to a
positive shock to the non-performing loans of Bank3 and
Bank61 (i.e., large and small banks), respectively.32 Fig-
ure 10 shows that the non-performing loans of banks
increase significantly when an adverse shock emanates
from Bank3.33 In contrast, Figure 11 provides evidence
that the remaining banks in the system are not affected
significantly when a similar type of shock emanates from
Bank61.
The presence of spillover effects from a large and
risky bank to the rest of the banks should be of concern
to the policy makers. Given our findings, there is a firm
basis for regulators and policy makers to closely monitor
large banks, as managers of larger banks may tend to
approve loans to riskier borrowers. Were the interest
rates to increase unexpectedly, these banks can easily
end up with substantial amounts of non-performing
loans, affecting the whole banking sector. Furthermore, if
these banks are considered to be too big to fail, their man-
agers would not refrain from lending to riskier borrowers
in search for higher yield when they believe that the
bank would be rescued by the Fed. As a consequence,
risk-taking behaviour of large risky banks could ulti-
mately yield a financial system which is open to systemic
failures.
6.3 | Sensitivity analysis
To check the robustness of our findings, we repeated the
analysis using banks' Z-score as an alternative measure of
risk and obtained similar results. In particular, Figure 12
plots the response of the Z-score to an expansionary mon-
etary policy shock. The figure depicts an immediate and
significant decline of the Z-score (including banks Bank2,
Bank7, Bank19, Bank53 among others) following the
FIGURE 13 Response of banks' Z-score to a negative shock in Bank3 Z-score [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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monetary policy shock, and provide support in favour of
the risk-taking channel. Interestingly, the Z-score also
increases for four of the banks in the sample (i.e.,
Bank13, Bank25, Bank30 and Bank58), suggesting that
bank risk for these institutions declines when the mone-
tary policy is relaxed. Among these four banks, only
Bank13 is relatively large.
When we use banks' Z-score to examine the spillover
effects, our results remain similar to our earlier findings.
Figure 13 plots the impulse responses of banks' Z-score to
a shock emanating from Bank3 (large bank). Here, we
observe that bank risk increases for a large fraction of
banks (the Z-score declines). Figure 14 displays the
results of the same experiment for the smallest bank
(Bank61) as the source of the shock. In this case, we do
not observe a significant response from any bank. We
would like to note that we also investigated the impact of
an adverse shock to Bank13's Z-score and found that it
did not have any impact on the rest of the banks in our
system. This is in line with our prior expectations.
Although relatively large, Bank13 has a low risk struc-
ture. Results for this experiment are available upon
request.
7 | CONCLUSION
In this study, we use the GVAR framework to investigate
three interrelated questions concerning the risk-taking
channel of the monetary transmission mechanism. We
examine the impact of a downward exogenous change of
policy rate on banks' risk-taking activities. We scrutinize
whether banks' risk-taking behaviour is homogeneous.
Lastly, we examine whether there are spillover effects
due to global and bank-specific shocks.
Our investigation, based on a panel of large U.S.
banks, provides evidence of an active risk-taking
channel in the United States. In particular, we show
that banks' risk-taking behaviour is more pronounced
for large, well-capitalized banks; an observation con-
sistent with Dell'Ariccia et al. (2017) who discuss the
role of capital structure in relation to banks' risk-tak-
ing behaviour. Lastly, we provide evidence that
shocks originating from larger and riskier banks have
lasting effects on the whole system, while shocks from
smaller and less risky banks do not. Our investigation
also yields that global shocks do not lead to spillover
effects in our system. The results are robust to the use
FIGURE 14 Response of banks' Z-score to a negative shock in Bank61 Z-score [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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of banks' non-performing loans and Z-score as alter-
native risk measures.
Our findings are relevant and important to both mon-
etary policy authorities and academic circles. Given that
standard monetary policy rules ultimately affect the
financial markets through several drivers such as credit,
liquidity and risk-taking, we argue that policy makers
should not ignore but monitor the stability of the finan-
cial intermediaries. In fact, as the debate goes on, many
countries which were affected by the global financial cri-
sis have already begun to implement macroprudential
policies to prevent the build-up of financial imbalances
and to ensure that the financial system is resilient to
shocks. More research along these lines is needed.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data that support the findings of this study are avail-
able from the corresponding author upon reasonable
request.
ORCID
Mustafa Caglayan https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1606-
6501
Kostas Mouratidis https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8402-
2762
ENDNOTES
1 In an earlier paper Borio and Lowe (2002) have shown that finan-
cial imbalances may develop in high growth, low inflation, low
interest rate economies which eventually require a monetary
response to preserve both financial and monetary stability.
2 We do not suggest that monetary policy causes banks to adopt
risk-taking behaviour. Monetary policy authorities aim to keep
the policy rate as close as possible to the equilibrium interest
rate. If the equilibrium rate happens to be low then the policy
rate naturally should be low. To that end, the safe asset litera-
ture provides a compelling explanation of why U.S. interest
rates could have been low (see for instance, Negro, Giannone,
Giannoni, & Tambalotti, 2017 and Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2012).
3 Furthermore, recent DSGE models have different implications
about the role of monetary policy on bank risk. Angeloni and Faia
(2013) show that monetary expansion and a positive productivity
shock increase bank leverage and risk while Zhang (2009) argues
that the reverse is true.
4 A fundamental problem of global models is the curse of dimen-
sionality, which arises when the number of variables is large com-
pared to the time dimension. Developing a global VAR approach,
Pesaran et al. (2004) were able to overcome this problem and ana-
lyze global interdependencies and the propagation of shocks
across countries.
5 Alternatives to GVAR modeling approach are the factor aug-
mented VAR (FAVAR) model or the panel VAR (PVAR). Both
FAVAR and PVAR can be viewed as data shrinkage processes.
While in the former model it is difficult to identify the unobserved
factors, the latter approach in certain cases becomes operational
by imposing restrictions on the autoregressive coefficients.
6 Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that the central bank should
react to asset prices only if the latter undermines inflation
stability.
7 The minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) did
not discuss issues of financial stability before the crisis of 2007.
See for instance Bernanke (2008).
8 For example, Ioannidou et al. (2015) argue that during periods of
financial uncertainty central banks tend to reduce the inter-
est rate.
9 Also see Caglayan, Kocaaslan, and Mouratidis (2017) who
followed similar reasoning to examine the role of financial depth
on the asymmetric impact of monetary policy shocks on output
growth.
10 This mechanism is similar but broader in spirit to the financial
accelerator mechanism. See, for instance, Bernanke et al. (1996),
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Chen (2001).
11 In some countries, such as Switzerland, a minimum rate of
return is reinforced by regulation.
12 Note that in both Jiménez et al. (2014) and Ioannidou et al.
(2015) monetary policy is exogenously given. In the former case
monetary policy is determined by the ECB while in the latter by
the Fed.
13 The difference between a Bayesian large scale VAR and a panel
VAR is that the former treat all variables symmetrically while
the latter takes into account the structure of the variables (for
details see Pesaran, 2015).
14 Problems of this type can be solved by using a matrix-balancing
algorithm known as RAS algorithm. The approach discussed
here has been used by Upper and Worms (2004) and Wells
(2004). See Appendix A for details.
15 VARX*(pi, qi) models with weakly exogenous non-stationary vari-
ables have been introduced by Harbo, Johansen, Nielsen, and
Rahbek (1998) and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000).
16 where xit =
~W
0
ixt = wi1Ik1 wi2Ik2  wiNIkN½  x1t x2t  xNt½ 
0.
17 All insured banks in the US are required to submit income-state-
ment and balance-sheet data to the Federal Reserve each quarter,
which is referred to as the Call Report.
18 The numerator measures total loans and lease financing receiv-
ables net of unearned income. The denominator is the bank's
total assets.
19 Twenty eight banks were not present over the entirety of our
sample while three banks registered a loan to asset ratio greater
than one.
20 Thirty nine banks failed to satisfy both criteria.
21 Overall, these banks account for 60% of the assets of the top 100
banks in the US.
22 See for example Laeven and Levine (2009), Foos, Norden, and
Weber (2010) and Altunbas, Marqués-Ibáñez, and Man-
ganelli (2011).
23 Barakchian and Crowe (2013) demonstrated that the Fed became
more forward looking after 1988. Also see Orphanides (2003),
Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Leeper, Sims, Zha, Hall, and
Bernanke (1996) on the forward looking behaviour of the Fed.
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24 A model is subject to non-fundamentalness when structural
shocks can not be recovered from the current and past observa-
tions, see Hansen and Sargent (1991).
25 For further discussion see Kilian (2013).
26 Romer and Romer (2004) measured monetary policy shocks
using a reaction function, in which the desired federal funds tar-
get rate was the dependent variable and the right-hand side vari-
ables included the level of the desired federal funds target prior
to the FOMC meeting and the forecasts of 17 series (the current
quarter of unemployment, eight forecasts for the real GDP
growth and the GDP deflator) taken from the Greenbook.
27 To compute the Romer and Romer (2004) type shocks, we
employed approximate Maximum likelihood Estimator (MLE) as
discussed in Kim (1994). For details concerning this algorithm
see Kim and Nelson (1999, section 5.5).
28 Davig and Leeper (2007) argue that ongoing regime changes
form expectations that can affect the response of inflation and
output to exogenous shocks. Extending the Taylor's principle by
allowing the parameters to follow a Markov process, they show
that a change from an active to a passive monetary policy can
affect the equilibrium under the former regime in two important
ways. First, if the passive regime is sufficiently passive or persis-
tent, then multiple equilibria can arise. Second, even in a deter-
minate equilibrium the possibility of switching to a dovish
regime can raise aggregate volatility.
29 Appendix B presents our extension to the RR approach.
30 Empirical results are obtained using the GVAR toolbox provided
by Smith and Galesi (2014).
31 Results for the unit root, endogeneity test and other statistics con-
cerning the relationship between domestic and foreign variables (i.
e., elasticities and pairwise correlation) are provided in Appendix C.
32 We identify shocks using the orthogonalization scheme
suggested by Dees et al. (2007). In particular, a recursive identifi-
cation scheme is adopted based on bank size where small banks
are preceded by large banks.
33 The magnitude of the response is not homogeneous across all
banks, some banks show a strong and significant response while
others show a mild but long lasting response. In some cases non-
performing loans decrease after about a year.
34 X contains N2 while the a and l provides 2N pieces of informa-
tion. Therefore, identification of X will require N(N−2) restric-
tions on X.
35 Note that ai is computed by summing across row i while sum-
ming down across column j gives lj.
36 The elements of X0 are given by x0ij =
0 if i= j
ail j,otherwise

 
.
37 For further details see Censor and Zenios (1997).
38 Kim and Nelson (2001), based on stability test results on the
regression coefficients, consider a time-varying parameter model
for the U.S. monetary growth function.
39 Note that Leybourne, Kim, and Newbold (2005) and Pantula,
Gonzalez-Farias, and Fuller (1994) show that the WS ADF test
outperforms both the traditional ADF and the GLS-ADF test pro-
posed by Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).
40 We also carried out the Augmented Dickey–fuller (ADF) test.
Results from these tests are similar and are available upon
request.
41 Test results are available from the authors upon request.
42 Note the specification of marginal model in Equation (C1) is
independent of the conditional VARX* model in Equation (B1).
Therefore, the lagged orders pi and q

i are not necessarily the
same as the pi and qi of bank specific VARX
*(pi, qi).
43 In particular, we compute, both in levels and in first differences,
the average pair-wise correlation of bank-specific variables. For
example, the average pair-wise correlation of the bank risk of
bank i is given by: bri =
1
N
PN
j=1
ρij brð Þ where ρij(br) is the correla-
tion of the bank risk of bank i with the bank risk of bank j, N is
the number of banks included in our sample. The residuals are
obtained after estimating all bank-specific VARX*(pi, qi) models.
44 Similar results are found by Sgherri and Galesi (2009) who
analysed credit growth using data from several countries.
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APPENDIX A: ESTIMATING BILATERAL
EXPOSURE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
For a system of N banks we are aiming to estimate a
matrix of the form34:
X=
x1,1    x1,j    x1,N

xi,1    xi,j    xi,N

xN ,1    xN ,j    xN ,N
2
666666664
3
777777775
a1

ai

aN
,
l1    lj    lN
where xij denotes outstanding loans made by bank i to
bank j, ai =
P
j
xi,j and l j=
P
i
xi,j are respectively, bank i's
interbank total assets and liabilities.35 In general, since
one can only observe each bank's total interbank debt (lj)
and credits (ai) further restrictions are required in order
to identify bilateral bank exposure (xij). In the absence of
any further information, a sensible approach suggested
by the literature is to assume that banks maximize the
uncertainty of their interbank activity. This implies that
the amount lend by bank i to bank j, is increasing in both
bank i's share of total lending and of bank j's share of
total borrowing. Normalizing
PN
i=1ai =
PN
j=1l j =1, the
individual exposure will be given by xij = ailj. In this spec-
ification, exposures reflect the relative importance of each
institution in the interbank market.
Note, the above problem does not account for the
restriction that a bank cannot be exposed to itself. How-
ever, it is straightforward to impose the restriction that
the diagonal elements of X are equal to zero. Given an
initial estimate of X0, one can solve a minimization prob-
lem to find a matrix X as close as possible to X0 subject to
row and column adding up restrictions (i.e., ai =
P
j
xi,j
and j=
P
i
xi,jÞ:
36 A suitable distance measure for this type
of problem is the cross-entropy between two matrices
(see Fang, Rajasekera, & Tsao, 2012). Following this
approach the appropriate interbank structure is given by
the solution to:
min
XN
i=1
XN
j=1
xijln
xij
x0ij
 !
subject to
XN
i=1
xij = l j
xij≥0:
Note also that xij = 0 if, and only if x
0
ij =0, and ln(0/0)
= 0. This sort of problem is solved numerically by using
RAS algorithm.37
APPENDIX B: Romer and Romer (2004)
APPROACH
Romer and Romer (2004) estimate the following model to
derive a proxy for monetary policy shocks:
Δffm = α+ βffbm +Σ
2
i= −1γiΔymi +Σ
2
i= −1λi Δymi−Δym−1,i
 	
+Σ2i= −1φipimi +Σ
2
i= −1θi pimi−pim−1,ið Þ+ ρum0+ εm,
ðB1Þ
where Δffm is the change in the desired funds rate around
the FOMC meeting at date m. The level of the desired
fund rate before any change related to meeting is denoted
by ffbm. The forecast of inflation, real GDP growth and
the unemployment rate are depicted as pi, Δy and u. The
subscript i refers to the forecast horizon: − 1 is the previ-
ous quarter, 0 is the current quarter, 1 is the next quarter
and 2 is two quarters ahead. We extent the RR approach
by allowing the estimated parameters in Equation (B1) to
be time-varying.38 In particular, we write Equation (B1)
in a state-space form as follows:
yt =X
0
tξt + et, et
~N 0,σ2e
 	
ðB2Þ
ξt =Fξt−1+ vt, vt ~N 0,Qtð Þ, ðB3Þ
where yt = Δffm, X
0
t = ffbm,Δymi, Δymi−Δym−1,

iÞ,pimi, pimi−pim−1,ið Þ,um0, and ξ = [α, β, γi, λi, φi, θi, ρ] for
i = −1, 0, 1, 2. Equations (B2) and (B3) are the measure-
ment and transition equation of (B1). The Kalman filter
is then applied to make inferences on the changing
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regression coefficients ξt. The Kalman filter gives insights
into how a rational agent updated his estimates of the
coefficients in a Bayesian context with the arrival of new
information in a world of uncertainty, especially under
changing policy.
Note that the conditional variance of Equation (B2)
consists of filter uncertainty and uncertainty concerning
the future shocks:
f tjt−1 =X tPtjt−1X
0
t + σ
2
e , ðB4Þ
where Pt|t − 1 represents filter uncertainty conditional on
information up to time t − 1 and σ2e represents uncer-
tainty concerning the future exogenous shocks. To
account for potential heteroscedasticity of the exogenous
uncertainty we estimate a model where et follows a Mar-
kov process. Therefore, the version of model (2) and (3)
with switching effects takes the following form:
et ~N 0,σ
2
e,St
 
ðB5Þ
σ2e,St = σ
2
0 + σ
2
1−σ
2
0
 	
St, σ
2
1 > σ
2
0: ðB6Þ
To estimate the model given by Equations (B2)–(B6),
we employ Kim (1994) algorithm.
APPENDIX C: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF
GVAR MODEL
Unit-root test
The estimation of each conditional VARX model is based
on the assumption that the variables included in these
models are integrated of order one. We test all variables
included in the GVAR model for unit root using the
weighted-Symmetric Augmented Dickey-fuller (WS
ADF) test introduced by Park and Fuller (1995).39 The
unit-root test results suggest that we cannot reject the
hypothesis of a unit root for most of the variables.40 We
also find that the global variables and output are both
integrated of order one.41
Exogeneity test
A vital assumption in the estimation of individual bank
VARX*(pi, qi) model is the weak exogeneity of bank-spe-
cific foreign variables (xit ). The weak exogeneity assump-
tion in the context of a cointegrating model implies that
there is no long-run feedback from bank-specific
domestic variables (xit) to the bank-specific foreign vari-
ables (xitÞ, without ruling out any lagged short-run feed-
back between the two sets of variables. If the weak
exogeneity assumption is not rejected then xit is said to
be a “long-run forcing” for xit, which implies that the dis-
equilibrium errors do not have any information about the
marginal distribution of xit . A formal test for the weak
exogeneity of bank-specific foreign variables is
implemented by testing the joint significance of the esti-
mated error correction terms in the marginal models of
the foreign variables. In particular, for each variable ℓ of
xit the following regression is carried out:
Δxit,ℓ= ci0,ℓ +
Xri
j=1
δij,ℓECM
j
i,t−1 +
Xpi
s=1
ϕis,ℓΔxit−s +
Xqi
s=1
θis,ℓΔx

it−s +
Xj=1
j=0
ψ ij,ℓΔdt− j + uit,ℓ,
ðC1Þ
where ECMij, t − 1, j = 1, 2,…ri, are the estimated error
correction terms associated with ri cointegrating vectors
found for bank i. In Equation (C1) pi and q

i are the
orders of lagged changes of domestic and foreign vari-
ables; (xit) and ðx

it ), respectively.
42 The test for weak
exogeneity is an F-test of the joint hypothesis that δij, ℓ =
0, for j = 1, 2,…, ri in Equation (C1). The F-test results,
which we summarize in Table D1, show that the weak
exogeneity assumption is not rejected for most of the for-
eign and global variables at the 5% significant level.
Impact elasticity of foreign variables on domestic
variables
Table D2 provides the contemporaneous effect of the for-
eign (starred) variables on their domestic (bank-level)
counterparts, which can be interpreted as the impact
elasticity of the starred variables on the domestic vari-
ables. The information presented in this table is particu-
larly informative in describing the linkages across the
banks under scrutiny. Most of these elasticities are signif-
icant and high in magnitude. In particular, we observe
that the elasticity of bank risk captured through non-per-
forming loans (brit and br

it ) is found to be significant in
more than 60% of the sample, mainly for larger banks in
the sample. This suggests the presence of relatively strong
co-movements across banks' non-performing loans.
Using Bank2 as an example, we see that a 1% increase in
non-performing loans of foreign banks, (br2tÞ, will lead to
a 2.7% increase in non-performing loans of Bank2 (br2t).
This finding, can be considered as prima facie evidence
of spillover effects across banks in our sample. Table D2
also shows that for a considerable fraction of banks there
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is high elasticity of bank return on assets (qit and q

it )
implying strong co-movements between bank-specific
and foreign return on assets. Separately, when we exam-
ine total loan to assets ratio, we observe a mild and nega-
tive elasticity (tlit and tl

it), which are significant only for a
few banks.
Average pairwise cross-sectional correlations
One of the key assumptions of GVAR modelling is that
idiosyncratic shocks of conditional VARX* models are
cross-sectionally weakly correlated such as Cov
(uit,ℓ,x

itÞ! 0, with N! ∞ , which ensures that foreign
bank variables are weakly exogenous. To see whether for-
eign variables are effective in reducing the cross-sectional
correlation of idiosyncratic shocks across all variables in
the GVAR, we have computed the average pairwise
cross-sectional correlation for the level and the first dif-
ferences of the endogenous variables in the model and
the associated residuals.43 This approach relates to the
cross-sectional dependence test proposed in Pesaran
(2004). In particular, conditioning the bank-specific
models on foreign variables, the remaining correlation
across banks is expected to be small.
TABLE D1 Test for weak exogeneity at the 5% significance level
Bank's name F-test Critical value 5% Non-perf. loans Return on assets Loan to assets GDP Interest rate hpi
Bank2 F(2,76) 3.1170 3.4775 2.7901 1.1392 5.7994 0.0127 0.7164
Bank3 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.0009 5.1588 0.1122 2.1454 0.4877 1.7710
Bank4 F(1,77) 3.9651 1.5094 1.9309 0.8267 0.8158 0.0072 0.3070
Bank5 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.9018 0.1347 0.3269 1.5914 2.0194 0.3593
Bank6 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.0412 0.0553 1.4257 0.0643 0.0640 3.9422
Bank7 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.5578 2.9591 1.4253 1.2630 7.2486 0.4582
Bank11 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.8892 2.1146 2.4606 0.9227 0.3254 0.9293
Bank13 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.4823 4.2033 2.4025 1.6600 3.8017 1.7200
Bank15 F(2,76) 3.1170 2.3757 1.0253 1.5619 2.6316 0.4066 1.5268
Bank16 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.3926 0.7289 0.1981 0.1039 0.8308 0.2694
Bank17 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.1077 1.5679 1.4994 0.6576 0.4908 1.0246
Bank19 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.7606 2.1864 1.0255 0.5495 0.9425 1.2365
Bank21 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.0665 4.6269 2.9454 1.9350 2.4128 1.7943
Bank25 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.4716 0.3736 5.8730 0.4513 0.1984 3.8645
Bank26 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.4335 2.3407 0.9013 0.3357 4.3716 0.2398
Bank29 F(1,77) 3.9651 1.2707 0.2132 1.1634 1.2994 0.4682 0.2249
Bank30 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.1343 0.8612 2.9386 0.3735 3.3881 0.7690
Bank33 F(3,75) 2.7266 1.1061 4.5798 0.4717 1.5142 0.5416 0.2772
Bank36 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.4226 2.0718 0.8569 4.7184 0.9441 1.3861
Bank38 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.7324 0.3926 2.4811 0.9101 7.2336 1.2041
Bank39 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.9952 0.0377 1.6445 0.2445 0.3726 0.0984
Bank42 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.8712 0.1628 1.9042 1.6287 1.2571 0.0213
Bank46 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.0097 1.4337 0.1994 8.5880 0.0048 1.6164
Bank51 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.6700 3.8676 0.6857 0.1578 1.3134 0.1268
Bank53 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.9231 0.2885 0.1015 1.0184 1.9646 0.0007
Bank54 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.1378 4.4748 0.9187 1.4493 1.2937 0.5683
Bank56 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.1013 2.4943 0.4794 0.9546 3.0382 1.0555
Bank58 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.7165 3.5846 0.8237 0.1425 2.1528 1.3477
Bank59 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.3865 0.3588 0.0683 0.0968 4.7613 0.0283
Bank61 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.4397 4.3236 1.7975 2.0857 5.0037 0.1572
Notes: The number which follows the word “Bank” refers to the ranking of the bank among the top 100 banks according to assets values at
the end of 2007. This means that Bank2 is the second largest bank in the United States in 2007.
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TABLE D2 Contemporaneous effect of foreign variables on domestic variables
Non-performing loans Return on assets Loan to assets Non-performing loans Return on assets Loan to assets
Bank2 2.716*** (11.087) 0.886** (3.223) 0.448 (1.154) Bank29 0.109* (1.652) 0.001 (0.003) 0.463** (3.062)
Bank3 1.374*** (10.035) 0.809*** (4.535) 0.181 (1.268) Bank30 0.03 (0.485) 0.109* (1.569) 0.068 (0.452)
Bank4 0.152** (2.6) 0.227* (1.907) 0.058 (0.278) Bank33 0.157* (1.994) 0.011 (0.186) 0.114 (1.114)
Bank5 0.353*** (4.574) 0.244* (1.522) 0.145 (1.139) Bank36 0.052 (0.807) 0.064 (0.563) −0.128 (−1.031)
Bank6 0.194*** (3.832) 0.064 (0.714) −0.017 (−0.084) Bank38 0.006 (0.106) 0.276** (2.047) −0.267** (−2.221)
Bank7 0.056 (1.324) 0.02 (0.434) 0.362** (2.197) Bank39 0.07* (1.589) 0.037 (0.753) −0.236* (−1.486)
Bank11 0.178** (2.832) 0.286** (2.133) −0.361 (−2.06) Bank42 0.513** (3.195) −0.075 (−0.305) 0.262 (1.278)
Bank13 0.034 (0.782) −0.144** (−2.096) 0.236** (2.14) Bank46 0.005 (0.086) 0.047 (1.134) −0.053 (−0.254)
Bank15 0.605*** (9.366) 0.19** (1.199) 0.172 (0.722) Bank51 0.02 (0.175) 0.147 (1.049) 0.139 (0.762)
Bank16 0.129* (1.812) 0.167* (1.565) 0.388** (2.695) Bank53 0.358* (1.75) 0.171 (1.345) −0.152 (−0.838)
Bank17 0.145 (1.245) 0.33** (2.252) −0.087 (−0.401) Bank54 −0.02 (−0.088) 0.34 (1.242) 0.362** (2.367)
Bank19 0.336** (2.157) 0.86* (1.791) −0.038 (−0.144) Bank56 −0.072 (−1.395) 0.073 (1.279) −0.045 (−0.202)
Bank21 0.037 (0.508) 0.509** (3.17) 0.463*** (4.184) Bank58 0.021 (0.74) 0.055 (1.238) 0.096 (0.92)
Bank25 0.123** (2.435) 0.203** (2.161) 0.701** (3.006) Bank59 −0.087 (−0.527) 0.018 (0.195) −0.082 (−0.577)
Bank26 0.276** (3.445) 0.263** (3.559) 0.103 (0.447) Bank61 0.075* (1.962) 0.017 (0.317) 0.167 (1.156)
Notes: The table shows the contemporaneous effect of the foreign (starred) variables on their domestic (bank-level) counterparts. These effects describe the co-movements among variables
across the 30 banks examined in this chapter.
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Table D3 presents the average pairwise cross-sectional
correlations for the level and the first difference of the
endogenous variables in the model, as well as the associ-
ated model's residuals. Results show that the average
cross-sectional correlation is generally high for the level
of endogenous variables and declines for the first differ-
ence and the estimated VARX* residuals. In particular,
the highest cross-sectional correlation is observed for the
level of non-performing loan of large banks. This obser-
vation is consistent with the view that non-performing
loans reflect changes in the underlying macroeconomic
environment. Whereas the return on assets and loans to
assets ratios show a lower correlation.44 This finding sug-
gests that changes in return on assets and loan to assets
ratio reflect changes in bank behaviour concerning man-
agerial and policy preferences.
When the first difference of the variables are consid-
ered, the correlations fall for all variables and banks. The
cross-sectional correlation for the residuals for all VARX*
models is very small, indicating that the model is success-
ful in capturing the common effects among the variables.
Moreover, these results show the importance and useful-
ness of modelling the bank-specific foreign variables, as
confirmed by the size of the bank residual correlations.
TABLE D3 Average pairwise cross-section correlations: Variables and residuals
Non-performing loans Return on assets Loan to assets
Level First diff. VECMX* Level First diff. VECMX* Level First diff. VECMX*
Bank2 0.6262 0.2070 −0.1004 0.0959 0.0186 −0.0729 −0.1016 0.0556 −0.0193
Bank3 0.6271 0.2351 0.0060 0.2925 0.1304 0.0406 0.0091 0.0766 0.0212
Bank4 0.4342 0.1928 0.0440 0.0732 0.0577 0.0441 0.0215 0.0371 0.0027
Bank5 0.5217 0.1688 −0.0095 0.1682 0.0747 0.0395 −0.1111 0.0020 −0.0022
Bank6 0.3987 0.1030 0.0168 0.2375 0.0791 0.0853 0.1501 0.0364 0.0081
Bank7 0.3773 0.1884 0.0002 −0.1873 0.0289 0.0464 0.1081 0.0570 0.0323
Bank11 0.5037 0.1884 0.0016 0.2276 0.1494 0.0856 0.0700 0.0739 0.0427
Bank13 0.5664 0.1025 −0.0342 −0.0141 0.0299 0.0357 −0.0651 0.0185 −0.0088
Bank15 0.4785 0.1337 0.0166 0.2232 0.1097 0.0107 0.1482 0.0561 0.0093
Bank16 0.3368 0.0868 0.0252 0.0549 0.0257 0.0190 0.1037 0.0438 0.0028
Bank17 0.6446 0.1225 0.0148 0.2945 0.0714 0.0194 −0.0548 −0.0026 −0.0001
Bank19 0.5610 0.0424 −0.0238 0.1025 0.0005 −0.0407 −0.0223 0.0398 0.0712
Bank21 0.5141 0.0823 0.0157 0.2706 0.1307 0.0593 0.1128 0.0582 −0.0107
Bank25 0.3743 0.1545 0.0340 0.1030 −0.0261 0.0192 −0.0348 0.0420 0.0236
Bank26 0.4633 0.0834 −0.0064 0.2031 0.1616 0.0304 −0.0413 0.0250 −0.0242
Bank29 0.5481 0.1825 0.0643 0.1728 0.0570 0.0608 0.1174 0.0688 0.0054
Bank30 0.2182 0.0819 0.0059 0.1416 0.0011 0.0393 0.0220 0.0622 0.0449
Bank33 0.4276 0.1331 0.0009 −0.0063 0.0175 0.0050 0.0274 0.0701 −0.0270
Bank36 0.5142 0.1014 0.0453 0.3146 0.0945 0.0274 0.0820 0.0196 0.0050
Bank38 0.5652 0.1466 0.0217 0.2428 0.1174 0.0488 0.0317 −0.0129 0.0215
Bank39 0.3760 0.1228 0.0336 0.3304 0.0833 0.0214 −0.0397 0.0128 0.0446
Bank42 0.5055 0.0941 0.0071 0.2909 0.0724 0.0047 −0.0368 0.0391 0.0208
Bank46 0.0977 0.0302 0.0153 0.1155 0.0339 0.0438 −0.0118 0.0048 0.0162
Bank51 0.4464 0.0343 −0.0315 0.2710 0.1142 0.0427 −0.0339 0.0441 0.0256
Bank53 0.4130 0.1784 −0.0153 0.1616 0.0626 0.0215 0.1733 0.0300 −0.0095
Bank54 0.3853 −0.0036 −0.0150 0.2367 0.0830 −0.0051 −0.0610 0.0770 0.0615
Bank56 0.2955 0.0510 0.0168 0.2447 0.0546 0.0178 0.1248 0.0396 0.0243
Bank58 0.3619 0.0223 −0.0087 0.1919 0.0114 0.0159 0.0717 −0.0031 0.0066
Bank59 0.5834 0.0209 0.0161 0.2528 −0.0494 −0.0422 0.1040 0.0915 0.0250
Bank61 0.4052 0.1383 −0.0178 −0.0678 0.0425 0.0783 0.1724 0.1068 0.0398
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